war is to attain a better peace". 3 Yet, after thirteen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States could face a potential post-2014 "peace" in which Central Asia is less stable, harbors more terrorists, and presents a greater security threat to the U.S. than on September 10, 2001 . Ironically (and tragically), a war originally begun to eliminate violent extremist safe havens in Afghanistan could have the unintended consequence of producing violent extremist safe havens in the Central Asian States (CAS), just to the north. This is a realistic and even likely future scenario, because U.S. strategists have insisted on viewing a strategic problem through a purely operational lens. However, this
is not the only future, and it is not inevitable. The proper strategy can prevent this outcome. This analysis will describe the most likely effects of the 2014 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan on the Central Asian States, focusing on the strategic center of gravity of that region, the Fergana Valley. It will then evaluate U.S. policy options and recommend a post-2014 strategy.
In 2001, the U.S. necessarily entered Afghanistan without an exit strategy. More troubling is that after more than ten years of fighting, it has yet to develop a theater strategy that adequately addresses the vast region to the north of Afghanistan. From the beginning, U.S. theater strategy has approached CAS from a purely short-term, operational perspective. In 2001, when the U.S. needed airbases to transit troops and supplies and to base aircraft, it successfully negotiated to establish them in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. 4 Later, when ground supply lines through Pakistan came under increasing pressure, the U.S. established the "Northern Distribution Network (NDN)", a complex of ground supply routes running from Europe to Afghanistan, transiting various Central Asian States. The U.S. was quick to assure the Central Asian governments and nervous neighboring regional powers Russia and China that its interest in the region was temporary and existed only in the context of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. This message has been reiterated frequently as this "temporary" U.S. regional presence has now exceeded ten years.
Thus, since 2001, U.S. military strategists have treated this region only as a geographic and occasionally political obstacle to operations-something to be transited en route to or from Afghanistan. In accordance with the current strategy, when OEF ends, operational requirements also end, and Central Asia will cease to be of concern.
Current U.S. military strategy in Central Asia is best summarized as, "do whatever is necessary to keep our bases and supply routes open until the last U.S. soldier leaves Afghanistan in 2014." Clearly, the collapse of the USSR only two years following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was a significant factor in the success of both the Taliban and the IMU that cannot be overstated. However, it is difficult to imagine a post-2014 scenario in which Afghan security forces control all Afghan territory and make it inhospitable to foreign Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). It is quite likely that U.S.
withdrawal will create another power vacuum, and precipitate another power struggle. Even less likely is the best-case scenario-in which stability in Fergana follows in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In this outcome, Fergana-centric VEOs would wither away, disband, or join in non-violent political processes. Violent extremism would then become a rarity or a nuisance, not seriously affecting regional stability. Some domestic and international critics of U.S. policy in Central Asia have long argued that U.S. presence is the real source of instability in the region providing a raison d'être for VEOs. 16 Presumably, in this view, removing the source (i.e., the U.S.)
would remove, or at least marginalize, the problem.
However, this presumption ignores several key facts, namely that the IMU and its ilk significantly pre-date U.S. interest, much less presence, in the Central Asia region, and that the IMU activity only abated when the U.S. destroyed their Afghan sanctuaries.
Furthermore, in a recent and relevant example, VEO activity in Uzbekistan did not decline after U.S. forces were expelled from the Kharshi-Khanabad Airbase in 2005.
Additionally, several prominent regional leaders have publicly expressed concern that U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will produce instability in Central Asia. 17 This opinion is also frequently voiced privately by regional leaders and defense and security officials. military is smarter, tougher, and more proficient after more than a decade at war, so too are Central Asian VEOs. IMU fighters have also had more than ten years to hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures in combat against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces.
These battle-hardened insurgents pose a much greater threat to Central Asia's relatively inexperienced security forces than their predecessors did in the 1990s.
Furthermore, post-2014 VEOs will continue to benefit from the now-robust Afghan narcotics trade (not the case in the 1990s). It is not an exaggeration to say that after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the strategic momentum in the Fergana Valley will again shift to Islamist VEOs.
U.S. Policy Options (3)
The United States has three broad policy options in Central Asia after 2014: While the U.S. views regional stability in terms of strong, independent states, internally respectful of human rights and externally at peace with its neighbors, it is not clear that the Russian Federation shares this definition. With China already dominating the region economically (a trend that will undoubtedly continue, even accelerate), Russia's primary value is as a security guarantor. Strong, independent states capable of securing their own borders and their own territory have less need for Russia. While
Russia fears Islamists on its southern border, it also has a vested interest in security dependency from the Central Asian States.
Additionally, Russia and China have generally opposed U.S. policy in Central
Asia for the last ten years, often vehemently. While both will gladly attempt to fill the influence vacuum, it is not likely that they will agree to carry water in support of U.S.
interests. Furthermore, when the U.S. leaves the region it will forfeit a great amount of influence. U.S. diplomats would have extremely limited leverage with which to convince to Russia and China to support U.S. interests in the Fergana Valley.
Multilaterally, as the SCO has formally called for an end to U.S. presence in Central Asia, it again seems unlikely that this organization would agree to work towards U.S. objectives in the region. 20 Meanwhile, neither the SCO nor the CSTO have proven to be effective beyond talk. Thus, while appealing at first glance, Option 1a falls into the "too good to be true" category, as it is extremely unlikely to occur. By relying almost totally on Russia, China, and organizations dominated by these countries, this option also significantly increases the risk that the desired U.S. strategy will fail and that
American national interests will not be attained. Finally, the status quo option does not achieve the theater strategic objective.
More than ten years of military-dominated regional policy in the region has not produced stability in the Fergana Valley. A successful post-2014 strategy for Central Asia cannot simply continue the operational focus of the past decade, implemented from its primary artifact, the TCMIA, and expect to gain long term acceptance in the region.
Option 3 -Lessons Learned and Best Practices.
There are many lessons to be learned from U.S. interaction with Central Asia in the last ten years. This policy option requires that the U.S. learn from the last ten years, thinking strategically while incorporating the best practices and eliminating unsuccessful or damaging legacy approaches.
The first lesson is to think and act strategically and not operationally. To be successful in the long-term, the U.S. must have a long-term approach, which requires first acknowledging the strategic significance of the region separate from operational considerations. Ultimately, the Fergana Valley, as the strategic center of gravity for the region, must be central to any future strategy. Stabilizing the Fergana Valley must be the primary U.S. objective, not the current "maintain our bases and supply routes"
objective.
By making a stable Fergana Valley the primary objective, the U.S. also aligns itself with regional governments. This makes the second lesson easier to implement, namely that regional governments should have the lead, as partners, rather than the landlord (them)-tenant (us) approach that the U.S. has pursued for the past ten years.
This goes beyond mere semantics. Paying regional governments "rent" for the use of their territory, whether as direct payments for bases, indirect aid packages tied to bases, or fees for transit (air and ground) reinforces the short-term nature of U.S. interest and commitment, which only encourages more rent-seeking behavior and brinksmanship by regional governments. Both the U.S. and the Central Asian governments have a shared strategic interest in a stable Fergana Valley. The strategy should be shared as wellfrom development to implementation.
However, Russia and China are also part of the region, and the SCO and CSTO are well-regarded, if ineffectual, regional organizations. Therefore, the U.S. should advocate and promote Russian, Chinese, SCO, and CSTO participation in the regional strategy. This is not a contradiction of the assertions above, namely that Russia and China have competing interests and are unlikely to participate actively in a strategy involving the U.S., even if the strategy is led by regional governments. It remains true that the U.S. should not expect substantive support from Russia or China, and may even face active opposition, not unlike the status quo. Rather, this approach is primarily for political, diplomatic, and informational purposes.
Regarding information and strategic communications, the third lesson is that silence is the enemy of success in Central Asia. The U.S. must frame the information environment by being public and open about its strategic objectives, and about the ways with which it intends to achieve them (with the obvious caveats for operational security and force protection). This goes beyond passive transparency, which has always existed, and toward an active, enthusiastic public promotion of the strategy by senior leaders and through public diplomacy platforms. Silence, even in a completely transparent environment, breeds conspiracy theories and black propaganda. In keeping with the previous lesson, the primary strategic communicators regarding U.S. strategy should be the Central Asian governments themselves, assisted by U.S. experts and resources where necessary.
Next, a large, overt U.S. military presence is counterproductive in Central Asia.
Despite the often heroic efforts of public affairs offices and the real and substantive humanitarian work done by America's finest, the fact remains that in Central Asia, the U.S. military is a lightning rod for criticism and conspiracy theorizing, even in the open and public environment described above. This means that the Transit Center must be closed in its current configuration, and in any subsequent re-named or re-missioned configurations. The security cooperation envisioned in this option does not require fulltime, semi-permanent U.S. military presence. Furthermore, the TCMIA is poorly positioned to support efforts in the Fergana Valley.
Lastly, U.S. assistance efforts in the last ten years have generally been unfocused, disconnected, and overall ineffective. This is particularly true of military-run security cooperation programs, which generally have followed a legacy approach from the 1990s, unrelated to current security realities in the region. This is also the case with many development, governance and public diplomacy programs.
However, from a standpoint of security cooperation, certain approaches have been effective at protecting the strategic center of gravity, the Fergana Valley.
Specifically, those programs and activities that focus on direct support, i.e., International Airport, and its closure will herald a new strategic direction. Given sunk costs and the existence of a first-rate facility, there will be strong temptation to maintain the TCMIA as a platform for security cooperation. This temptation must be avoided. The
Transit Center has a specific purpose, and one that will not be required after 2014. More importantly, with its location just outside the Kyrgyz capital city, it is poorly positioned to support a Fergana-based strategy. On a related issue, while the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is not nearly as contentious as the TCMIA, it is another artifact of the old approach, and its benefits to the Central Asians are vastly overstated. The U.S. would do well to downplay the significance and impact of the NDN.
Next, all diplomatic, economic, and military efforts should be redirected in support of a comprehensive regional strategy that focuses on stability in the Fergana Valley.
This strategy should make every attempt to include Russia, China, and regional organizations, with the understanding that their participation will be unlikely. Fears of expanded Russian or Chinese influence are misguided. First, influence is not a zerosum "great game." Second, Russian political and social influence in the region is already dominant, as is Chinese economic influence. Cooperation with the U.S. might even lessen their influence.
Option 3 facilitates the maximum application of all elements of national power, and in the optimal proportion. Its focused approach allows the implementation of a more effective strategy with fewer resources than are currently allocated to the region.
Because it addresses instability in the Fergana Valley directly, this option has the greatest short-term risk to the U.S. personnel and interests. However, it is the only option that directly and adequately addresses U.S. strategic interests in Central Asia.
Conclusion
In addition to its operational importance, this region is strategically significant in its own right, and critical to sustaining success in post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Failure to view the CAS region through a broader, long-term strategic lens jeopardizes success in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, is detrimental to regional security and stability, and increases the likelihood that U.S. will be drawn back on less than desirable terms.
group that seeks the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate of Central Asia. The Department of State does not consider HuT to be a Foreign Terrorist Organization, but it is outlawed in all Central Asian States and Russia. As the IMU is the oldest, most capable, and most dangerous violent extremist organization (VEO) in Central Asia, for simplicity this analysis refers primarily to IMU. However, the effects of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will benefit all Islamist VEOs in Central Asia, and the recommended U.S. policy option will address them all. 10 In 1999, the IMU launched a military offensive against the Batken region (then part of Osh Oblast) with the objective of severing it from the Kyrgyz Republic and creating an embryonic Caliphate. Batken was selected due to its remote location, proximity to Fergana, weak control by Kyrgyz central authorities, and weakness of Kyrgyz security forces. The IMU successfully seized several villages and inflicted significant casualties on Kyrgyz forces before ultimately being beaten back by Kyrgyz counteroffensives. Batken Oblast is the poorest, most devout, and most remote region of the Kyrgyz Republic. It is a narrow, mountainous region that borders the Fergana Valley to the south. Post-Soviet political geography isolated it from the rest of the Kyrgyz Republic even more than its physical geography. Most Soviet roads ran through the Fergana Valley proper, meaning that to travel from the Oblast Capital of Osh to most points in Batken required crossing Uzbekistan. Given the poor relations between the two countries, movement of military forces through Uzbek territory (i.e., along the most direct routes) is generally not possible.
